America’s Pacific demands and the limits of fiscal reality in Asean — Phar Kim Beng

JUNE 2 — At the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered what sounded like a strategic imperative: Asian allies and partners should raise their defence spending to 5 per cent of GDP to match the scale of the threat posed by China.

US allies and partners in Asia continue to spend well below 5 per cent of GDP on defence. In 2024, Singapore allocated 2.8 per cent of its GDP to defence, followed by South Korea (2.6 per cent), Taiwan (2.1 per cent), Australia (1.9 per cent), Japan (1.4 per cent) and the Philippines (1.3 per cent), according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

South-east Asian defence officials also attending the Shangri-La Dialogue broadly welcomed Hegseth’s speech and his reaffirmation of Washington’s commitment to the region, but some voiced serious concerns about the feasibility of increasing defence spending.

Indeed, such a request, framed as a measure of deterrence, struck a discordant note across the hall — particularly in Southeast Asia, where economic resilience, not military escalation, defines the essence of regional security.

What Hegseth articulated is, in effect, a revival of the Guam Doctrine of 1969 — a proposition that allies and partners should do more for their own defence.

This time, however, the request is wrapped in a populist “America First” narrative shaped by President Trump and championed by figures like Vice President JD Vance, placing fiscal responsibility squarely on the shoulders of others.

The contradictions are glaring. While demanding higher defence spending from its Asian allies, the US is simultaneously imposing tariffs on their exports, especially targeting South-east Asia’s key sectors in steel, semiconductors, and electronics. These economic burdens reduce the very fiscal space needed for the type of defence buildup the US envisions.

Countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia — who welcomed Hegseth’s speech — have quietly signalled that matching European-style defence budgets is not only unrealistic, but contrary to the region’s developmental priorities.

As Maj Gen Kristomei Sianturi of Indonesia noted, even allocating 1 per cent of the national budget to defence is a stretch. For these states, security stems from stability, diplomacy, and economic growth — not from entering an arms race that benefits American defence contractors more than their own people.

South-east Asia, led by Malaysia as Asean Chair, has long championed a policy of “active nonalignment,” a concept Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim reiterated at the summit.

This is not mere fence-sitting. It is a deliberate strategy to remain outward-facing, independent, and free from being co-opted by rival power blocs. In practice, it means cooperating with both the US and China, while aligning with neither.

This stance resonates with Asean’s ethos. In contrast to Nato, Asean has never been a military bloc. Its primary tools have been multilateral diplomacy, economic interdependence, and non-interference.

The success of the Asean-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) show that integration — soft, not hard — remains Asean’s preferred path to resilience.

Hegseth’s call to emulate Europe’s 5 per cent military commitment also fails to appreciate the deep differences in historical experience. Europe, after Ukraine, faces an existential threat along its eastern frontier.

Asia, while navigating tensions in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, has not suffered a major interstate war in decades. The threshold for panic — and for reordering budgets on such a scale — is simply not comparable.

Moreover, there is a structural contradiction in America’s own Indo-Pacific engagement. While Trump’s administration threatens to reduce troop levels in South Korea and possibly Japan, the same administration is demanding more contributions from these states.

This contradiction does not go unnoticed in Asia. Some, like Professor Da Wei of Tsinghua University, question America’s credibility in maintaining regional balance while leveraging tariffs and troop withdrawals as bargaining chips.

Hegseth touted new initiatives like the NMESIS deployment to the Philippines and repair facilities for P-8 patrol aircraft in Australia. These are steps in the right direction. But if strategic cooperation is to be meaningful, it cannot be built on pressure and paternalism. A sustainable regional security architecture must be based on mutual respect, tailored to local fiscal realities and political contexts.

To this end, Asean countries should not allow themselves to be strong-armed into military buildup under the guise of collective deterrence.

Rather, they must invest in security as they define it — through stronger coast guards, cyber defence, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral maritime cooperation with frameworks such as the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).

These align better with regional threats such as piracy, illegal fishing, and transnational crime than Cold War-style militarisation.

Ultimately, the U.S. must understand that in Asia, partnerships are earned — not enforced. Trust is not built through military might alone, but through consistency, trade equity, and respect for strategic autonomy.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the fulcrum of 21st-century geopolitics, America’s ability to remain a trusted partner will depend on how well it listens — not just how loudly it speaks.

* Phar Kim Beng is a professor of Asean Studies, International Islamic University Malaysia.

** This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.